“Facts” and “values” in Politics: Are they separable? By Felix E. Oppenheim Political Theory Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 1973,54-68.
It insists that political sciences limit itself to factual assertions (however theoretical) which are objectively—i.e., intersubjectively, verifiable by reference (however indirect) to observational evidence. p.54.
To speak of ‘facts’ and ‘values’ is misleading—as if facts and values were things and could be divided and “allocated” like pieces of cake. p.55.
This accounts for the propensity of speakers, writers, and even scientists to use “freedom” in such a way as to cover all and only those situations which they wish to commend. p.56.
Evidently, the same language of morals is a vehicle for opposing moral points of view. p.62.
I agree—i.e., a political scientist who adopts the Marxist framework of irreconcilable class conflict is likely to take a value position different from an investigator who uses the model of peaceful conflict resolution. p.65.
Only if we have already accepted the general moral principle—say, that the equal fulfillment of basic needs is desirable—can we go from the factual assertion that doing A is conducive to that goal, to the value judgement that doing A is good. p.66.
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